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Lawlor: Wake up and Smell the Smog: The Third Circuit Provides Clarity on

WAKE UP AND SMELL THE SMOG:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT PROVIDES CLARITY ON CERCLA’S
FEDERALLY PERMITTED RELEASE REPORTING EXEMPTION
IN CLEAN AIR COUNCIL V. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.
I. LET’S CLEAR THE AIR: AN INTRODUCTION TO REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS AFTER CAA-GOVERNED AIR POLLUTANT
RELEASES IN STEEL PRODUCTION PROCESS
Coke-oven emissions from steel production pose substantial
public health concerns.1 In the initial stages, steel production requires processing raw coal into coke, which produces coke-oven gas
as a by-product.2 Burning raw, uncleaned coke-oven gas emits benzene and other hazardous pollutants into the air.3 These emissions
pose carcinogenic and other health risks to humans.4
To protect the public from harmful airborne contaminants,
the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires states adopt state implementation
plans (SIPs) to achieve National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS).5 SIPs consist of control measures and regulations a state
must use to meet and maintain NAAQS.6 Pennsylvania’s SIP specif1. See Coke Oven Emissions, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://
www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/substances/coke-oven (defining coke-oven gas emissions and their effect on public health); see also What Is
Coke?: Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Coke Oven Facilities, CLEAN AIR COUNCIL, https:/
/pacokeovens.org/what-is-coke/greenhouse-gas-emissions/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2021) (emphasizing significant public health concerns associated with coke-oven
air pollutants).
2. See Coke Making Process, U.S. STEEL MON VALLEY WORKS, https://monvalley.uss.com/uss/portal/monvalley/monvalleyworks/cokemakingprocess/!ut/p/
z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8ziLQ0MnB2dDB0NDFx9HQ0Cgw0NLd0
CwgxdXEz0w_Ep8DYy0I8iRr8BDuBIhP4ofEp8gkzwKwA7EawAjxsKckMj
DDI9FQEEH33r/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021)
(explaining coke-oven gas is by-product of igniting “bituminous” coal).
3. See What Is Coke?: Nature and Extent of Air Emissions, CLEAN AIR COUNCIL,
https://pacokeovens.org/what-is-coke/nature-and-extent-of-air-emission/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (detailing implications of burning coke-oven gas).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 15TH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS: COKE-OVEN EMISSIONS 1 (2021), https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/content/profiles/cokeovenemissions.pdf (finding coke-oven emissions are
cancerous).
5. See Basic Information About Air Quality SIPs, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https:/
/www.epa.gov/sips/basic-information-air-quality-sips (Jan. 25, 2022) (defining
SIPs). The EPA established NAAQS for six “criteria” pollutants harmful to public
health and the environment, including: carbon monoxide, lead air, nitrogen oxide, ozone pollution, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide. Id. (listing common
air pollutants with NAAQS).
6. Id. (explaining goal of SIPs).
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ically leaves the enforcement of emissions and reporting standards
to local authorities.7 In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, the relevant authority is the Allegheny County Health Department
(ACHD).8
If an Allegheny County-based “major source” breakdown has a
“substantial likelihood of causing the emission of air contaminants
in violation of [the] [Pennsylvania SIP]” the source must submit a
detailed notice to the ACHD.9 Federal law also requires the polluting source to report those incidents to the U.S. Coast Guard’s National Response Center (NRC).10 Such federal reporting
requirements, however, are subject to certain exemptions.11
In Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel,12 the Third Circuit directly addressed these federal reporting requirements and exemptions following a pollution event in Allegheny County.13 The
environmental watchdog group Clean Air Council (CAC) sued U.S.
Steel alleging the corporation did not comply with its federal reporting obligations after emitting high levels of raw coke-oven
gas.14 The Third Circuit held that because U.S. Steel operated
under a CAA permit, its emissions were exempt from federal reporting.15 The opinion ultimately provides federal courts with a

7. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2020(c)(2) (2022) (stating local regulators handle SIP
violations).
8. Id. (outlining entity managing SIP violations in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania).
9. See County of Allegheny, Pa., Ordinance No. 16782, and Allegheny County
Health Department (ACHD) Rules and Regulations, Art. XXI Air Pollution Control, § 2108.01(c)(1), (2) (1994) (summarizing reporting requirements for pollution control equipment breakdowns that have substantial likelihood of air
contaminant emissions); see also Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (Sept. 28,
2021) (categorizing sources of hazardous air pollutants). According to the EPA, a
major source is “a stationary source or a group of stationary sources that emit or
have the potential to emit 10 tons per year or more of a hazardous air pollutant or
25 tons per year or more of a combination of hazardous air pollutants.” Id. (defining major source).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (describing NRC reporting requirements for onshore
facilities emitting hazardous substances in quantities prohibited under § 9602(a)).
11. See id. (stating “federally permitted release[s]” are exempt from reporting
requirements).
12. 4 F.4th 204, 207 (3d Cir. 2021) (evaluating reporting requirements and
exemptions).
13. For a discussion of Clean Air Council’s facts, see infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
14. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 206 (outlining basis of lawsuit).
15. Id. at 211 (summarizing court’s holding).
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clearer picture of a major source’s compliance obligations after a
pollution event.16
This Note examines the Third Circuit’s decision and the potential impact of less stringent reporting requirements.17 Part II
discusses the facts and procedural history of Clean Air Council.18
Part III provides the dispute’s legal background.19 Part IV outlines
the Third Circuit’s reasoning in arriving at its holding.20 Part V
offers a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s opinion.21 Lastly, Part
VI examines the potential impact Clean Air Council will have on pollution reporting requirements, accountability for polluting sources,
and air quality in Allegheny County.22
II. AIR POLLUTION PROBLEM IN WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA: THE
FACTS OF CLEAN AIR COUNCIL
U.S. Steel operates Mon Valley Works, which consists of three
steel facilities located throughout Allegheny County, near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.23 The three Mon Valley Works facilities—the
Clairton Plant, the Edgar Thomson Plant, and the Irvin Plant—
each play a specific role in the steel production process.24 The
Clairton Plant first processes raw coal into coke, the Edgar Thompson Plant then uses the coke to make steel, and the Irvin Plant finishes the steel.25
16. See Melissa Horne & Randy Brogdon, Appeals Court Upholds Expansive Interpretation of Clean Air Act Exemption from CERCLA Release Reporting, TROUTMAN PEPPER: ENV’T L. AND POL’Y MONITOR (June 24, 2021), https://www.environmentall
awandpolicy.com/2021/06/appeals-court-upholds-expansive-interpretation-ofclean-air-act-exemption-from-cercla-release-reporting/ (concluding Third Circuit
opinion clarifies reporting requirement for facilities subject to requirements
under CAA and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)).
17. For a discussion of Clean Air Council’s impact, see infra notes 183-99 and
accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Clean Air Council,
see infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the legal framework underlying the Clean Air Council
opinion, see infra notes 43-128 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of a step-by-step analysis of the Third Circuit’s holding in
Clean Air Council, see infra notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
21. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Clean Air Council,
see infra notes 157-82 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the potential impact of Clean Air Council on environmental law moving forward, see infra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
23. Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., 4 F.4th 204, 207 (3d Cir. 2021)
(noting facility at issue).
24. Id. (summarizing three plants of Mon Valley Works near Pittsburgh).
25. Id. (explaining steel making process at Mon Valley Works).
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When the Clairton Plant processes raw coal into coke, it produces coke-oven gas as a by-product.26 If raw coke-oven gas is
burned without undergoing a cleaning process, it “belches benzene, hydrogen sulfide, and other pollutants into the air.”27 To
prevent the belching of such pollutants, the Clairton Plant cleans
the raw coke-oven gas before the other plants subsequently use it.28
In December 2018 and June 2019, the Clairton Plant’s control
rooms were shut down and offline for months due to fires.29 Despite the offline control rooms, U.S. Steel continued to burn raw
coke-oven gas as fuel for steel production.30 Pollutants were subsequently emitted into the air.31 U.S. Steel reported the emissions
and control room fires to the ACHD in compliance with its CAA
Title V permits and regulations.32
CAC sued U.S. Steel in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.33 It argued U.S. Steel should have reported the pollution to the NRC pursuant to CERCLA.34 CAC also
asserted that the emissions were not “federally permitted releases”
under 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).35 In response, U.S. Steel claimed the
releases were federally permitted under CERCLA because the emissions were “governed by” its CAA Title V permits.36
The district court granted U.S. Steel’s motion to dismiss, holding that under CERCLA “the emissions were ‘federally permitted
26. Id. (introducing where coke-oven gas is produced in steel making
process).
27. Id. (describing how coke-oven gas can pollute atmosphere).
28. See Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 207 (addressing process Mon Valley Works
uses to prevent coke-oven gas pollutants from entering atmosphere); see also U.S.
STEEL, MON VALLEY WORKS CLAIRTON PLANT OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RE16 (2019), https://www.ussteel.com/documents/40705/71641/
PORT
U.+S.+Steel+Clairton+Plant+2019+Report.pdf (detailing Clairton Plant’s emissions
control process). The Clairton Plant “operates a state-of-the-art by-products plant
that recovers tar, ammonia, light oil (benzene, toluene, and xylene), and elemental sulfur from the coke oven gas . . . .” Id. (outlining by-products removed from
coke-oven gas).
29. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 207 (stating why control rooms at Mon Valley
Works were offline and inoperable for months).
30. Id. (referencing how coke-oven gas pollutants were emitted at Mon Valley
Works).
31. Id. (describing pollution from burning un-cleaned coke-oven gas).
32. Id. (outlining U.S. Steel’s compliance with its SIP CAA reporting
obligations).
33. See id. at 206 (noting CAC filed suit against U.S. Steel).
34. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 208-09 (arguing U.S. Steel’s emissions did not
qualify for CERCLA reporting exemption).
35. Id. at 208 (declaring only emissions compliant with CAA permits and regulations are eligible for exemption).
36. Id. at 209 (providing emissions “governed by” CAA permits are subject to
reporting exemption).
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releases’ because they were governed by” the facility’s CAA permits.37
CAC appealed, and on June 21, 2021, the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling, utilizing the same CAA Title V permit
and CERCLA reasoning as the district court.38 U.S. Steel, therefore, was exempt from reporting the pollution to the NRC.39
In support of U.S. Steel’s position, the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America, American Chemistry Council, National Mining Association, American Coke and Coal Chemicals Institute, and Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry
appeared as amici.40 The amicus curiae brief argued the district
court correctly held that CERCLA is clear because the “‘federally
permitted release’ exception is ‘unambiguous and does not require
that air emissions comply with a Clean Air Act permit in order to be
exempt.’”41 The brief also stressed that imposing a federal reporting requirement is “unnecessarily duplicative” and poses unnecessary regulatory burdens.42
III. AIR POLLUTION IS A BAD SOLUTION: A STATUTORY,
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL BACKDROP
A. Clean Air Act
In 1970, Congress enacted the CAA to address dense levels of
smog plaguing cities and industrial centers around the U.S.43 The
CAA implements four major regulatory components.44 First, it requires the EPA to establish NAAQS “for pollutants that are common in outdoor air, considered harmful to public health and the
37. Id. (describing district court’s holding and reasoning).
38. Id. at 206, 213 (noting appeal from district court and Third Circuit’s
holding).
39. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 206, 213 (highlighting reporting implications
of court’s holding).
40. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, American Chemistry Council, National Mining Association,
American Coke & Coal Chemicals Institute, and Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry Supporting Appellee at 1, Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., 4
F.4th 204 (3d Cir. 2021) (No. 20-2215) (supporting U.S. Steel’s position).
41. Id. at 3 (quoting Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:19-CV-1072,
2020 WL 2490023, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2020)) (asserting CERCLA’s language
clearly supports U.S. Steel’s argument that it meets federal reporting exemption).
42. See id. (contending pollution event reports to both local and federal authorities would be onerous).
43. See Clean Air Act Requirements and History, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https:/
/www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history (Aug.
12, 2021) (outlining CAA’s purpose).
44. See Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act#caa70 (Dec. 7, 2021)
(detailing core tenets of 1970 CAA).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

5

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3

204

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 33

environment, and that come from numerous and diverse
sources.”45 Next, the CAA establishes New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) that authorize the EPA to develop technologybased standards for certain classifications of sources.46 Third, the
CAA implements National Emission Standards for Hazardous Pollutants (NESHAPs).47 Finally, the CAA requires states to develop
SIPs, which are subject to approval by the EPA, to achieve
NAAQS.48 In 1977, Congress revised the CAA to prevent air quality
deterioration in areas attaining NAAQS.49 In 1990, Congress made
additional revisions instituting new regulatory programs to control
acid rain and issue stationary source operating permits.50
The EPA’s role in setting NAAQS is a foundational aspect of
the CAA.51 The EPA sets air quality standards for six main pollutant categories known as “criteria pollutants”: particulate matter
(also known as particle pollution), ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead.52 Additionally, the CAA contains specific provisions to address hazardous air pollutants
(HAPs).53 These pollutants can cause cancer and birth defects in

45. See Reviewing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS): Scientific and
Technical Information, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/naaqs (Aug.
18, 2021) (stating purpose of NAAQS).
46. See Demonstrating Compliance with New Source Performance Standards and State
Implementation Plans, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/
demonstrating-compliance-new-source-performance-standards-and-state-implementation-plans (Feb. 2, 2022) (describing NSPS).
47. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Compliance Monitoring, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/national-emission-standards-hazardous-air-pollutants-compliance-monitoring (Mar. 1, 2022)
(defining NESHAPs as “stationary source standards for hazardous air pollutants”);
see also Evolution of the Clean Air Act, supra note 44 (referring to NESHAPs as one of
four main components of CAA).
48. For a discussion of SIPs and their objectives, see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
49. See Evolution of the Clean Air Act, supra note 44 (summarizing 1977 CAA
amendments).
50. Id. (describing 1990 CAA amendments).
51. See EELP Staff, Modifying the Air Quality Standards Review Process, HARV. L.
SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/subverting-the-process-of-setting-health-based-air-quality-standards-eelp-interviews-janetmccabe/ (Dec. 10, 2019) (discussing NAAQS as bedrock of America’s advancement towards cleaner air).
52. See Clean Air Act Requirements and History, supra note 43 (listing six criteria
pollutants).
53. Id. (describing other pollutants CAA provisions address).
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addition to detrimental environmental impacts.54 The EPA also
regulates benzene, a toxic pollutant found in coke-oven gas.55
The CAA relies on a system of “cooperative federalism” to
achieve NAAQS set by the EPA.56 This system requires states to submit comprehensive SIPs, subject to EPA approval.57 A SIP is “a collection of regulations and documents used by a state . . . or local air
district to implement, maintain, and enforce . . . NAAQS, and to
fulfill other requirements of the Clean Air Act.”58
Pennsylvania implements the CAA through its approved SIP.59
The SIP primarily leaves the enforcement and standard-setting
functions in Allegheny County to the ACHD.60 Accordingly, the
ACHD adopted its own “emissions standards, monitoring standards,
permitting programs, and reporting requirements,” known as Article XXI.61 Pennsylvania’s SIP implements these local regulations
and gives them the effect of “binding federal law.”62 Article XXI
also provides that the operator of an Allegheny-based source must
notify the ACHD if the source emits air contaminants in violation of
the Pennsylvania SIP.63 In this notification, the operator must detail: the equipment that broke down; the potential cause of the
breakdown; the estimated length of time; the “specific material(s)
which are being, or are likely to be, emitted . . . .”; the estimated
54. See What Are Hazardous Air Pollutants, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/haps/what-are-hazardous-air-pollutants (Jan. 5, 2022) (stating effects
of HAPs on environment and human health).
55. See Initial List of Hazardous Air Pollutants with Modifications, U.S. ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/haps/initial-list-hazardous-air-pollutants-modifications (Jan. 5, 2022) (listing 188 HAPs EPA regulates); see also MICK PLATTS,
THYSSENKRUPP ENCOKE USA, THE COKE OVEN BY-PRODUCT PLANT (2021), https://
accci.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/the-coke-oven-by-product-plant-07-222021.pdf (listing benzene as one contaminant found in coke-oven gas).
56. See Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., 4 F.4th 204, 207 (3d Cir. 2021)
(explaining federal government sets national standards but states implement
them).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (requiring SIPs achieve federal NAAQS).
58. See Basic Information About Air Quality SIPs, supra note 5 (defining SIPs).
59. See EPA Approved Regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sips-pa/epa-approved-regulations-pennsylvania-sip
(Sept. 7, 2021) (detailing Pennsylvania SIP provisions).
60. See Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 208 (noting ACHD’s role in implementing
Pennsylvania SIP).
61. See id. (discussing ACHD’s role in setting local air pollution standards); see
also EPA Approved Regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP, supra note 59 (specifying EPAapproved Article XXI regulations).
62. See Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 208 (stating ACHD regulations are given
effect of federal law under CAA); 40 C.F.R. § 52.2020(c)(2) (2022) (providing regulation implementing ACHD Art. XXI).
63. See ACHD Art. XXI § 2108.01(c)(1) (detailing reporting requirements for
events resulting in high likelihood of emitting air contaminants).
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quantity of materials; and the “[m]easures . . . taken or to be taken
to minimize the length of the breakdown, the amount of air contaminants emitted, or the ambient effects of the emissions . . . .”64
The CAA also requires that all major sources receive Title V
operating permits.65 State and local agencies typically issue Title V
permits, which are also called “Clean Air Act part 70” permits.66
These permits are comprehensive and consolidate all the source’s
requirements under its respective SIP.67 They must also include
“enforceable emission limitations and standards” and provide “inspection, entry, monitoring, compliance certification, and reporting requirements . . . .”68
B. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)
Congress enacted CERCLA, commonly known as “Superfund,”
on December 11, 1980.69 CERCLA provides a response program
for remediation of abandoned, contaminated sites.70 More specifically, “CERCLA provides a Federal ‘Superfund’ to clean up uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous-waste sites as well as accidents,
spills, and other emergency releases of pollutants and contaminants
into the environment.”71
64. ACHD Art. XXI § 2108.01(c)(2)(A)-(F) (summarizing specific disclosure
requirements).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (requiring major sources have operating permits);
see also Basic Information About Operating Permits, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/title-v-operating-permits/basic-information-about-operating-permits
(Feb. 11, 2022) (summarizing important aspects of Title V operating permits).
66. Basic Information About Operating Permits, supra note 65 (noting issuer of
operating permits).
67. See § 7661c(a) (explaining Title V permits in greater detail).
68. See § 7661c(a),(c) (providing contents of Title V operating permits).
69. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (outlining CERCLA provisions); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Overview,
PACE L. LIBR. (May 26, 2021, 3:56 PM) [hereinafter CERCLA: Overview], https://
libraryguides.law.pace.edu/CERCLA (discussing creation of CERCLA).
70. See CERCLA: Overview, supra note 69 (discussing primary goals of
CERCLA).
71. See Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (Superfund), U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter Summary of CERCLA], https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-comprehensive-environ
mental-response-compensation-and-liability-act#:~:text=the%20Comprehensive
%20Environmental%20Response%2C%20Compensation%2C%20and%20Liability%20Act%20%2D%2D%20otherwise,and%20contaminants%20into%20the
%20environment (Sept. 28, 2021) (detailing pollution incidents CERCLA seeks to
alleviate).
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These remediation efforts are made possible by a congressionally appropriated Superfund that acts as a trust.72 In the
Superfund’s first five years, Congress raised over $1.6 billion from
taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries.73 Funding rose to
$8.5 billion in 1986 after Congress amended CERCLA with the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).74 These
amendments provide “site specific amendments, definitions clarifications, and technical requirements . . . including additional enforcement authorities.”75
Another goal of CERCLA is to impose Superfund liability on
parties responsible for hazardous releases at contaminated sites.76
This liability is retroactive, joint and several, and strict.77 Liability is
retroactive in that a party can be held liable for its involvement in
polluting a site before CERCLA’s 1980 enactment.78 Additionally,
liability is joint and several, meaning any “one potentially responsible party (PRP)” can be held liable for the entire cost of the
cleanup.79 Finally, liability is strict in that it holds a party responsible if it contributed in any way to hazardous waste at a site.80
In addition to the reporting requirements under the CAA,
CERCLA mandates federal reporting in certain circumstances.81 If
a facility releases more than a set threshold of pollutants, CERCLA
requires the facility operator to “immediately notify the National
Response Center,” a division of the U.S. Coast Guard.82 Not all releases, however, require such notification.83 In relevant part, Congress exempts facilities from reporting any “federally permitted
72. See Superfund: CERCLA Overview, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview (Feb. 14, 2021) (characterizing Superfund as trust).
73. See id. (describing primary source of Superfund’s initial funding).
74. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (amending CERCLA); see also The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-amendments-and-reauthorization-act-sara
(Mar. 15, 2021) (noting Superfund size increase).
75. See Summary of CERCLA, supra note 71 (explaining purpose of SARA).
76. See Superfund Liability, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-liability (June 8, 2021) (discussing CERCLA liability).
77. Id. (analyzing extent and characteristics of CERCLA liability).
78. Id. (defining retroactive nature of CERCLA liability).
79. Id. (discussing CERCLA joint and several liability).
80. See id. (explaining CERCLA strict liability).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (providing reporting requirements when releasing
prohibited amounts of hazardous substances).
82. Id. (outlining reporting requirements).
83. See § 9603(f) (detailing reporting exemptions built into statute).
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release.”84 This exemption includes air emissions subject to a permit or regulation under the CAA or state plans implementing the
CAA.85 Failure to comply with CERCLA’s reporting requirements
may result in a penalty in excess of fifty-five thousand dollars per
day depending on the date of assessment.86
C. Administrative Guidance
A 1992 EPA administrative decision, In re Mobil Corp.,87 provides administrative guidance on the “subject to” language in CERCLA’s “federally permitted release” exemption.88 In 1991, the
Regional Administrator of the EPA issued three complaints against
Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil).89 The complaints stated that Mobil
failed to comply with CERCLA’s reporting requirements after three
air releases of hazardous substances occurred at one of its
facilities.90
Mobil argued that because it had a CAA permit, it qualified for
CERCLA’s “federally permitted release” exemption.91 Mobil
claimed, therefore, it was not subject to CERCLA’s federal reporting requirements.92 The EPA, however, found CERCLA’s “subject
to” language in the “federally permitted release” exemption to be
“inherently ambiguous” and ruled the exemption precluded emissions that violate CAA permits.93
D. Statutory Interpretation Framework
In dealing with questions of statutory interpretation, courts
first construe the plain meaning of the provision’s words at the time
84. § 9603(a) (stating federally permitted releases are exempt from
reporting).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10)(H) (defining “federally permitted release” in
context of CERCLA).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b)(1) (outlining penalty for failure to comply with
reporting requirements); see also Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule,
84 Fed. Reg. 2,056, 2,059 (Feb. 6, 2019) (detailing inflation-adjusted CERCLA civil
monetary penalties).
87. 1992 EPA ALJ WL 293133, at *8–10 (providing guidance on similar CERCLA provision at issue in Clean Air Council).
88. See id. (discussing CERCLA reporting exemption).
89. Id. at *1 (describing administrative actions against Mobil).
90. Id. (stating basis for initial EPA complaints against Mobil).
91. Id. at *6 (outlining Mobil’s argument that exception is not limited to CAA
permit-compliant emissions).
92. In re Mobil Corp., 1992 EPA ALJ WL 293133, at *6 (describing further Mobil’s argument).
93. Id. at *8, *17 (noting EPA’s administrative holding that only CAA permitcompliant emissions qualify for “federally permitted release” exemption).
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of the statute’s enactment.94 If the language of the provision is
clear and unambiguous, the court’s analysis generally stops there.95
When the plain meaning of the text is ambiguous, however, courts
interpret the provision’s meaning within its broader statutory context.96 If the ambiguity is resolved under the plain meaning or
broader statutory context methods, the inquiry ends without the
need to pursue a legislative history analysis.97 When a court resolves ambiguity, deference should not be granted to a prior administrative branch decision.98
1. Statutory Context
In Russello v. United States,99 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted a provision based on its broader statutory context.100
In 1977, a grand jury indicted petitioner Joseph Russello for racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud in violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970.101 The district court entered a judgment against Russello, ordering him to forfeit the
proceeds of his illicit acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1).102 The
RICO provision maintains that a person convicted under RICO
shall forfeit to the government “any interest . . . acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962.”103 The issue then turned to
whether profits and proceeds derived from illicit racketeering constitute an “interest” under § 1963(a)(1).104
94. See Statutory Construction, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction (last visited May 10, 2022) (discussing plain language analysis as starting point in statutory construction).
95. See Steven Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes - Or Not: Plain Meaning and
Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 325 (2009) (articulating how plain
meaning of words in statutes generally controls).
96. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (viewing statutory
provision in its greater statutory context to eliminate ambiguity).
97. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019)
(establishing legislative history should not complicate judicial analysis when plain
meaning and statutory context eliminate ambiguity).
98. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (emphasizing
partial holding regarding judicial deference to administrative decisions).
99. 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (discussing Supreme Court’s holding that statutory
context eliminated ambiguity surrounding provision at issue in case).
100. Id. (referencing basis of Supreme Court’s opinion).
101. Id. at 17 (noting indictments).
102. Id. at 18 (addressing district court’s holding ordering Russello to turn
over illegal money).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (outlining RICO’s statutory provision requiring
forfeiture of illegally obtained funds).
104. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 17 (summarizing foundational issue in case).
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Russello argued § 1963(a)(1) only covered interests “in an enterprise” and “not profits and proceeds.”105 As such, he proposed
that some of his money was exempt from forfeiture.106 In its analysis, the Supreme Court read § 1963(a)(1) within the full context of
RICO.107 The Supreme Court averred that if Congress meant to
restrict § 1963(a)(1) to only “interests in an enterprise,” Congress
would have done so as it did in the following subsection.108 The
Court, therefore, concluded that when Congress includes or excludes specific language in one part of a statute and not in another,
it is presumed that Congress acted intentionally.109
2. Legislative History
Courts have established that statutory interpretation should
not consider legislative history when reading a provision in its statutory context or when analyzing its plain meaning provides a clear
answer.110 In Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media,111 a
South Dakota newspaper filed a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request for data held by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regarding the annual Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) redemption data from 2005 to 2010.112 The
USDA did not disclose all the information, only granting a partial
request to the newspaper.113 The newspaper subsequently sued the
USDA for a more comprehensive data release.114
The issue in Food Marketing Institute dealt with whether FOIA’s
Exemption 4, which protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or
confidential,” applied to the SNAP data withheld by the USDA.115
The Supreme Court ultimately classified the information as “confidential” under Exemption 4.116 The Court found that the data fit
105. Id. at 20 (providing Russello’s argument).
106. See id. (discussing Russello’s defense against RICO forfeiture provision).
107. See id. at 23 (explaining Court interpreted § 1963(a)(1) in context of
other RICO provisions).
108. Id. (stating evaluation of full statutory context eliminated ambiguity).
109. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (referencing Court’s holding).
110. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019)
(establishing when legislative history should play role in judicial analysis).
111. 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2361 (2019) (discussing plaintiff’s data request denied
by USDA).
112. Id. (outlining facts of lawsuit).
113. Id. (reiterating USDA’s denial of SNAP data to plaintiff).
114. Id. (describing basis of lawsuit).
115. Id. (stating predominant issue in case regarding Exemption 4 as applied
to SNAP data).
116. Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2366 (providing holding).
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within the plain meaning of the word “confidential” at the time of
FOIA’s enactment.117 Although legislative history supported an interpretation of “confidential” beyond its plain meaning, the Supreme Court asserted that legislative history can never “muddy” the
meaning of “clear statutory text.”118
3. Administrative Deference
When a court’s application of “traditional tools of statutory
construction” resolves statutory ambiguity, deference to administrative guidance should not factor into the court’s analysis.119 In Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis,120 the Supreme Court resolved three substantively similar cases.121 The Supreme Court specifically referenced
the facts of Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP,122 in which an accountant
entered into an employment agreement with Ernst & Young requiring arbitration for all employment-related disputes.123 The accountant later filed suit against the firm alleging wage violations
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and sought to litigate
under the FLSA’s collective action provision.124 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reviewed whether the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and Arbitration Act (AA) prohibited enforcement of the employment contract’s arbitration agreement.125
The employee-plaintiffs supported their argument by referencing administrative agency interpretations of the NLRA and AA
favorable to their cause.126 In holding that the arbitration agreements must be enforced, the Supreme Court stated that “deference
117. Id. at 2363 (finding “confidential” meant “private” or “secret” at time of
FOIA’s enactment and SNAP data fell within definition).
118. Id. at 2364 (explaining legislative history serves no purpose in resolving
unambiguous statutory text).
119. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (holding under
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), administrative agency decisions should not receive deference if “traditional tools of
statutory construction” eliminate ambiguity).
120. 138 S. Ct. at 1619 (2018) (detailing case in which Supreme Court did not
defer to administrative guidance).
121. Id. (noting opinion resolved three separate cases).
122. 834 F.3d 975, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining one case for review
before Supreme Court in Epic Systems Corp.), rev’d sub nom., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018), and vacated, 894 F.3d 1093 (mem.) (9th Cir. 2018).
123. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619-20 (stating parties involved in lawsuit
entered into employment contract containing arbitration clause).
124. Id. at 1620 (describing basis of lawsuit).
125. Id. at 1620-21 (discussing relationship between AA and NLRA and resulting effect on enforcement of arbitration agreements at issue in case).
126. See id. at 1629 (noting employee’s request to defer to 2012 National Labor Relations Board opinion suggesting NLRA supersedes AA).
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is not due unless a ‘court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction,’ is left with an unresolved ambiguity.”127 The Court
found no unresolved ambiguity, stating that “[w]here, as here, the
canons supply an answer, ‘Chevron leaves the stage.’”128
IV. UP

IN THE

AIR NO MORE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS

In Clean Air Council, the Third Circuit predominantly focused
on the meaning of “subject to” in the context of CERCLA’s “federally permitted release” exemption in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10)(H).129
The court first established that the phrase “subject to” has only two
possible interpretations: “governed or affected by” as U.S. Steel argued, or “obedient to” or “in compliance with” as CAC argued.130
Given CERCLA’s entire context, the court concluded Congress only
intended the phrase to mean “governed or affected by.”131
The Third Circuit first acknowledged that according to Black’s
Law Dictionary, “subject to” could mean either “governed or affected
by” or “obedient to.”132 Given this plain language ambiguity, the
court proceeded to read the “federally permitted release” exemption in CERCLA’s broader statutory context.133 The court explained that in other sections of § 9601, Congress explicitly used
the language “in compliance with” a permit when discussing pretreatment standards or injection control programs.134 Congress did
not, however, choose to use that specific language in

127. Id. at 1630 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)) (stating circumstances under which deference to administrative agency decision is appropriate).
128. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1630 (2018) (highlighting inapplicability of
Chevron deference, or deference to administrative agency decisions, in this case).
129. See Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp., 4 F.4th 204, 207 (3d Cir. 2021)
(stating focal point of Third Circuit’s analysis).
130. See id. at 209 (describing two dueling interpretations of § 9601(10)(H)’s
“subject to” language).
131. Id. (concluding Congress meant “subject to” to mean “governed or affected by” based on contextual analysis).
132. Id. (finding Black’s Law Dictionary supported both CAC’s and U.S. Steel’s
interpretations of phrase “subject to”).
133. See id. (describing next step in court’s reasoning after plain language
analysis left unresolved ambiguity).
134. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(10)(F),(J) (referencing definition of “federally
permitted release” and its mention of provisions requiring compliance with permits or standards); see also Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 209 (arguing Congress purposefully specified compliance with certain permits or regulations in other
sections of CERCLA).
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§ 9601(10)(H) when discussing CERCLA’s “federally permitted release” exemption.135
To bolster its reasoning, the Third Circuit cited the Supreme
Court’s holding in Russello.136 In relevant part, the opinion provided that the court presumes Congress acts intentionally when it
includes specific language in one section of a law but not in another section of the same law.137 If Congress meant to condition
the reporting exemption on compliance with a CAA Title V permit,
it would have done so as it did in other sections of CERCLA.138
The court further supported its contextual argument by citing
specific CERCLA provisions differentiating the phrase “subject to”
from “in compliance with.”139 For example, the court referenced
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1), stating “each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States . . . shall be subject to, and comply
with, this chapter.”140 If Congress intended “subject to” to mean
the same as “comply with,” the two phrases would be redundant in
that provision.141
Proceeding from its statutory interpretation analysis, the court
determined that reading “subject to” as “governed or affected by” is
logical within CERCLA’s greater framework.142 The Third Circuit
held that “reading ‘subject to’ as ‘governed or affected by’ makes
sense,” as it supports CERCLA’s “cooperative federalism”
scheme.143 The court concluded that reporting to both state and
federal authorities would be duplicative and run antithetical to
135. See Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 209 (drawing distinction between language of § 9601(10)(H) and other CERCLA provisions).
136. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) (relying on
Russello to support argument that Congress excluded phrase “in compliance with”
purposefully from § 9601(10)(H)).
137. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) (supporting
contention that Congress purposefully excluded language specifying compliance
with CAA permit from § 9601(10)(H)).
138. Id. (asserting Congress purposefully included and excluded language in
CERCLA).
139. Id. (emphasizing Congress did not intend for “subject to” to mean “in
compliance with,” as CAC argued).
140. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 209 (providing example of CERCLA provision that differentiates “subject to” phrase from language mentioning compliance
with permits or regulations).
141. Id. (illustrating Congress’s purpose for including and excluding certain
language).
142. See id. at 210 (suggesting “governed or affected by” interpretation fits
within CERCLA’s context).
143. Id. (concluding Third Circuit’s interpretation of “subject to” fits CERCLA’s theme of “cooperative federalism”).
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CERCLA’s foundational principle of “cooperative federalism,”
which produces implementation autonomy.144
The court continued its analysis by addressing both the CAC’s
citation to a Senate committee report and a Senate committee
chairman’s comments suggesting pollution accidents should be federally reportable under CERCLA.145 The Third Circuit stated the
report did not specifically discuss the interpretation of “subject to”
within CERCLA’s context.146 Even if it did, the court relied on the
proposition in Food Marketing Institute that legislative history should
not obscure clear statutory text.147 After finding the statutory text
to be clear, the Third Circuit did not give weight to CERCLA’s legislative history.148
The court also directly addressed CAC’s citation to the EPA
administrative decision In re Mobil Corp., which held that the CERCLA phrase “subject to” was ambiguous and read it to exclude emissions that violate CAA permits.149 Citing this opinion, CAC asked
the court to grant deference to its holding.150 Although the decision in In re Mobil Corp. favors CAC’s argument, the Third Circuit
concluded it should not be afforded deference.151 In making this
decision, the Third Circuit adhered to Supreme Court precedent
supporting not deferring to an administrative decision when “traditional tools of statutory construction” resolve statutory ambiguity.152
Given that CERCLA’s context resolved the meaning of “subject to,”
there was no ambiguity for the EPA to settle.153

144. See id. at 207 (noting additional connection between Third Circuit’s decision and its alignment with CERCLA’s “cooperative federalism” structure).
145. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 210 (addressing CAC’s argument favoring
legislative history).
146. Id. (describing Senate materials cited by CAC and their irrelevance to
contested issue).
147. Id. (citing Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364
(2019)) (discussing precedent that legislative history should not obscure clear
meaning of statutory text).
148. See id. (dismissing need for legislative history analysis).
149. See In re Mobil Corp., 1992 EPA ALJ WL 293133, at *8 (noting conclusion
of EPA’s decision).
150. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 210 (outlining CAC’s request that Third Circuit defer to 1992 EPA administrative decision).
151. Id. at 210-11 (stating administrative deference is unapplicable in this
case).
152. Id. at 211 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Counsel, 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)) (noting court’s reliance on principles discussed in Chevron to support assertion that administrative deference comes into play with unresolved statutory ambiguity).
153. Id. (rejecting need for administrative deference).
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In its conclusion, the Third Circuit addressed CAC’s argument
that the district court was wrong to grant U.S. Steel’s motion to
dismiss because it was an affirmative defense to contend that hydrogen sulfide, benzene, and coke-oven emissions were federally permitted releases.154 In response, the Third Circuit stated courts
sometimes consider affirmative defenses on a motion to dismiss and
may dismiss a complaint when “an unanswered affirmative defense
appears on its face.”155 The federally permitted release exemption
applied on the face of the complaint, showing U.S. Steel’s emissions
were subject to its Title V CAA permits and ultimately exempt from
federal reporting.156
V. A BREATH OF FRESH AIR, BUT MAYBE A STEP IN THE WRONG
DIRECTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
OPINION IN CLEAN AIR COUNCIL
The Third Circuit applied traditional rules of statutory interpretation to arrive at a pointed conclusion.157 According to the
Third Circuit: “[w]hen Congress writes, context matters,” and context also clarifies.158 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the
Third Circuit established clear and concise reasons why the contextual language of CERCLA cleared up any ambiguity surrounding
the meaning of “subject to” in § 9601(10)(H).159 By resolving the
issue on contextual grounds and avoiding a murky legislative history analysis, the court arrived at the proper legal outcome.160
Despite the court’s intuitive statutory interpretation analysis,
the opinion was perhaps misguided on some important aspects.161
Specifically, the court mischaracterized the notion that reporting to
the NRC is duplicative and threatens CERCLA’s “cooperative feder154. Id. (addressing whether U.S. Steel’s affirmative defense barred district
court from granting motion to dismiss).
155. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 211 (outlining grounds for affirming motion
to dismiss).
156. Id. (finding U.S. Steel’s CAA Title V permits cover hydrogen sulfide, benzene, and coke-oven gas).
157. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s step-by-step analysis, see supra
notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
158. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 206 (outlining foundation of Third Circuit’s
reasoning that statutory context matters).
159. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s reasoning, see supra notes 129-56
and accompanying text.
160. Clean Air Council, 4 F.4th at 206 (suggesting court’s analysis provided
clear and structured reasoning without diving into convoluted inquiry).
161. For a discussion on shortcomings in the Third Circuit’s reasoning, see
infra notes 162-82 and accompanying text.
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alism” spirit.162 Such an assertion implies that by reporting to the
NRC, federal intervention will threaten the local response authority
granted to the ACHD under CERCLA and Pennsylvania’s SIP.163
Additionally, this reasoning suggests the Third Circuit perceived
the reporting requirement as jeopardizing the spirit of “cooperative
federalism” inherent in CERCLA.164
This reasoning does not align with federal response functions
in the aftermath of air pollution events.165 The NRC website states
it is not a response agency.166 Instead, it primarily serves as an
emergency call center resource.167 Emergency call centers field initial reports of pollution events and forward the information to requisite state and local authorities for proper response action.168 The
NRC does not assume response efforts or relieve local regulators of
their duties.169 Instead, the NRC supports state and local authorities by forwarding information to assist them.170
Although the NRC does not handle response efforts itself, reports to the NRC activate a National Contingency Plan and federal
government response capabilities.171 The federal government’s response effort, however, is generally to “promote coordination
among the hierarchy of responders and contingency plans.”172 An
162. For a discussion of federal response functions after pollution events and
legitimate public purposes served by CERCLA reporting, see infra notes 165-82 and
accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis, see supra notes 129-56
and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s determination that its holding fits
within CERCLA’s “cooperative federalism” scheme, see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion on shortcomings in the Third Circuit’s reasoning and
functions of federal authorities responding to pollution events, see infra notes 16582 and accompanying text.
166. See Welcome to the National Response Center, U.S. COAST GUARD NAT’L RESPONSE CTR., https://nrc.uscg.mil/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2021) (stating NRC is not
response agency).
167. Id. (establishing NRC primary function as call center).
168. Id. (reiterating call center and information distributing functions of
NRC).
169. See id. (demonstrating absence of information on NRC website suggests it
does not assume response effort responsibilities).
170. See id. (highlighting true function of NRC).
171. See National Response Center, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/emergency-response/national-response-center (Nov. 19, 2021) (defining federal response functions after reporting to NRC).
172. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)
Overview, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/emergency-response/national-oil-and-hazardous-substances-pollution-contingency-plan-ncp-overview (Mar.
30, 2021) (stating main focus of federal response efforts in addressing hazardous
pollution event).
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on-scene coordinator in the impacted region integrates the local
on-site authorities with the potentially responsible party to determine the appropriate response plan.173 Federal assistance may not
be required if state and local government agencies have the proper
resources to handle the pollution event.174 Given federal response
efforts focus on promoting coordination with local authorities and
providing support where needed, the Third Circuit’s suggestion
that NRC reporting threatens “cooperative federalism” is
overstated.175
Additionally, the Third Circuit’s conclusion that CERCLA reporting would be duplicative and serve no public purpose misses
the mark.176 It is true that reporting similar pollution information
to local Allegheny County authorities and the NRC may be repetitive on its face.177 This conclusion, however, overlooks the fact that
dual reporting can theoretically serve a legitimate public purpose.178 Requiring potential polluters to face the additional hurdles of dual reporting and corresponding financial repercussions
for non-compliance contribute to an overall stricter regulatory environment for polluters.179 Most Americans support stricter environmental laws and regulations, and research suggests a tighter
regulatory environment results in fewer domestic carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions.180 The Third Circuit’s assertion, therefore, fails
173. See National Response System Flowchart, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/emergency-response/national-response-system (May 17, 2021)
(describing response function of federal on-scene coordinator).
174. See id. (noting federal assistance may not be required in some instances).
175. For a discussion of federal response functions following hazardous pollution events, see supra notes 165-75. For a discussion of Clean Air Council, see supra
notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion on shortcomings in the Third Circuit’s reasoning about
NRC reporting serving no public purpose, see infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis, see supra notes 129-56
and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the purpose of NRC reporting, see supra notes 171-75
and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion on CERCLA’s reporting requirements, see supra notes
81-86 and accompanying text.
180. Kristen Bialik, Most Americans Favor Stricter Environmental Laws and Regulations, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2016/12/14/most-americans-favor-stricter-environmental-laws-and-regulations/
(explaining Americans’ view that environmental regulations are worthwhile);
Itzhak (Zahi) Ben-David, Stefanie Kleimeier & Michael Viehs, Research: When Environmental Regulations Are Tighter at Home, Companies Emit More Abroad, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/research-when-environmental-regulations-are-tighter-at-home-companies-emit-more-abroad (finding companies that
are biggest contributors of CO2 emissions emit less when domestic environmental
regulations are tighter). Companies, however, typically produce more emissions
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to recognize the positive domestic environmental effects that an additional reporting requirement on sources may have.181 As sources
face greater accountability for their actions, extra reporting may
likely incentivize them to take greater precautionary measures in
the future.182
VI. LOWERING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POLLUTERS: POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF CLEAN AIR COUNCIL
The Third Circuit’s decision represents a significant victory for
U.S. Steel and other potential polluters within the jurisdiction.183
The opinion clarifies CERCLA’s federal reporting exemption as applying solely to air emissions governed by a Title V CAA permit.184
Only unregulated air emission releases not governed by CAA permits are subject to the NRC reporting requirements and subsequent non-compliance fines.185 In practical effect, Clean Air Council
provides clearer pollution reporting obligations for all sources.186
The most significant impact of the Third Circuit’s decision,
however, is that sources governed by CAA permits may now avoid
potentially serious financial penalties for non-compliance with
CERCLA’s NRC reporting requirements.187 CERCLA levies fines in
excess of fifty-five thousand dollars per day against any source that
fails to comply with its requirements.188 As a result of the Third

abroad in countries with less stringent environmental obligations. Ben-David et
al., supra (describing tradeoff of tighter domestic environmental regulations).
181. See Ben-David et al., supra note 180 (noting tighter environmental regulations produce positive domestic environmental effects).
182. See Economic Incentives, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
environmental-economics/economic-incentives (Sept. 29, 2021) (explaining role
liability assignment plays to incentivize polluters to make cautious and “socially
conscious” decisions).
183. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s step-by-step analysis, see supra
notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s holding clarifies the CERCLA
reporting exemption, see supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of Clean Air Council’s implications regarding who the
reporting requirements apply to, see supra notes 129-56 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of how Clean Air Council clarifies reporting requirements, see supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of CERCLA penalties, see supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of CERCLA’s NRC reporting requirements and related
financial penalties for non-compliance, see supra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text.
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Circuit’s decision, polluting sources can avoid this additional layer
of CERCLA reporting and corresponding financial penalties.189
Clean Air Council serves to lower accountability for sources that
cause pollution events in violation of the CAA.190 By eliminating
added potential financial penalties and reporting requirements, it
is less costly for polluters such as U.S. Steel to continue polluting.191
Even in the event of hazardous air pollutant emissions, the Third
Circuit’s decision eliminates a form of potential liability for
sources.192
Allegheny County ranks among the worst in the nation on various air quality metrics.193 Specifically, the Liberty-Clairton non-attainment area, which is inside the greater Pittsburgh nonattainment area, contains high levels of particulate matter pollution.194 U.S. Steel’s Clairton Coke Works plant produces a majority
of that area’s pollution.195 Research has also shown that cancer

189. For a discussion of how this decision allows CAA permit-governed
sources to avoid CERCLA reporting penalties, see supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of the decision’s impact on reducing reporting obligations and eliminating associated non-compliance penalties, see supra notes 183-89
and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of Clean Air Council’s favorable cost implications for U.S.
Steel and other sources, see supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of Clean Air Council’s elimination of CERCLA reporting
liability for CAA permit-governed sources, see supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
193. See Allegheny County Air Quality, ALLEGHENY CNTY. HEALTH DEP’T, https://
www.alleghenycounty.us/Health-Department/Programs/Air-Quality/Air-Quality.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2021) (noting air quality among county’s most pressing public health challenges); see also 10 Health Facts You Need to Know, BREATHE
PROJECT, https://breatheproject.org/resources/public-health/#health-facts (last
visited Oct. 10, 2021) (highlighting Allegheny County’s air quality problem).
194. See Michael Reilly, Dynamics of US Steel’s Clairton Coke Works Emissions Affecting the Liberty-Clairton Non-Attainment Area 1, 19 (Apr. 15, 2013)
(unpublished MPH thesis, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with University of
Pittsburgh institutional repository) (referencing high levels of particulate matter
pollution in various areas in Greater Pittsburgh); see also Michael Machosky, The
Mon Valley Has Some of the Dirtiest Air in the Country – Again, NEXT PITTSBURGH (Apr.
7, 2021), https://nextpittsburgh.com/latest-news/the-mon-valley-has-some-of-thedirtiest-air-in-america-again/ (noting high levels of particulate matter in LibertyClairton area of Allegheny County, ranking among worst areas for air quality in
nation); Mon Valley Sees 55th H2S Exceedance, Liberty-Clairton Air Quality Again Worst
in Nation Friday Morning, GASP (Nov. 5, 2021), https://gasp-pgh.org/2021/11/05/
mon-valley-sees-55th-h2s-exceedance-liberty-clairton-air-quality-again-worst-in-nation-friday-morning/ (stating Liberty-Clairton achieved worst air quality index in
nation for period on Nov. 5, 2021).
195. See Reilly, supra note 194, at iv (establishing link between U.S. Steel and
high levels of particulate matter surrounding Clairton Coke plant).
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risks are higher for residents living in the Liberty-Clairton area encompassing U.S. Steel’s Clairton Coke Works.196
Ultimately, stricter air control requirements in Allegheny
County may be needed to solve the pressing air quality issue, but
the Third Circuit’s decision in favor of U.S. Steel cuts back on reporting obligations for polluters.197 Greater reporting requirements and exposure to additional financial penalties can set a
strong precedent for holding sources accountable for causing hazardous pollution events and associated adverse public health effects.198 Stricter requirements are necessary to prevent sources,
such as U.S. Steel’s Clairton Coke Works, from vastly contributing
to air pollution and causing harmful public health implications in
surrounding areas.199
Zachary Lawlor*

196. See id. at 35 (finding health-outcome risk for cancer is significantly
higher for residents of Liberty-Clairton area than other parts of Allegheny
County); see also Kristina Marusic, Western Pennsylvania Environmental Groups Seek
More Monitoring of Cancer-Causing Benzene, ENV’T HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.ehn.org/western-pennsylvania-air-pollution-2645706392/particle-2
(describing air pollution from U.S. Steel putting residents at greater risk of cancer
and discussing Allegheny County’s poor air quality and resulting greater cancer
risks); see also Debra Smit, Future Needs Clean Air, Healthy Communities, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (May. 27, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/
2021/05/27/Future-needs-clean-air-healthy-communities/stories/202105270023
(stating Allegheny County ranks in top one percent nationally of counties for cancer risk from air pollution); see also Allegheny County’s Air Monitors Comply with Federal
Standards for the First Time. What Does This Mean for the Air We Breathe?, NEXT PITTSBURGH (Feb. 5, 2021), https://nextpittsburgh.com/features/allegheny-countys-airmonitors-comply-with-federal-standards-for-the-first-time-what-does-this-mean-forthe-air-we-breathe/ (referencing 2018 study ranking Allegheny County as one of
top counties with highest risk of cancer from air pollution).
197. For a discussion of the pressing air quality issue in Allegheny County, see
supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. For a discussion of less strict compliance obligations and lessened accountability for polluters resulting from this decision, see supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of less strict compliance obligations and lessened accountability for polluters resulting from this decision, see supra notes 183-92 and
accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision may not set a strong
enough precedent to adequately deal with pressing air quality issues in Allegheny
County, see supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A., Financial Economics, 2020, University of Rochester. I would like to
thank my family and friends for their continued support and helping me get to
where I am today.
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